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The objective of this thesis is to show how crises can
develop in an organization, what their impacts are, and what
managerial procedures may he used to cope with these situa-
tions. The scope of the thesis is limited to higher manage-
ment levels. Crises occur especially as a result of rapid
environmental changes or changes in organizational variables.
The following problems may be typical: general uncertainity
,
necessity of extraordinary resources, multiple, simultaneous
problems, time constraints, stress, change in power structures,
and change in communication and information patterns. The
following decision-making procedure is suggested: Establish-
ing psychological equilibrium at all levels, structuring of
the problems, adapting the organizational structure, assign-
ing responsibilities for solving problems, establishing a
time budget, coordination, and implementation and control.
Preparatory measures can help to avoid crises, or at least
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I . INTRODUCTION
Crises change the normal activities of organizations.
They occur in different ways, and often happen unexpectedly
and suddenly. Leaders and managers at every level face
extraordinary problems and are more or less accustomed to
handling such special situations.
The first objective of this thesis is to provide insight
into the development of crises in organizations and their
impacts on the elements that are relevant in the decision-
making process. The second objective is to shew the specif-
ically important factors a leader or manager has to consider
when making decisions in crises. The last objective is to
develop a basic integrative decision-making medei which will
help a manager to cope systematically and effectively with
crisis situations.
The expositions are especially aimed at the leader or
manager whose organisation faces real crises only exception-
ally. Their scope includes higher command or management
levels, disposing of staff personnel, though seme more general





Several definitions exist for the word "crisis." Some
examples out of Webster's Third New I r~err.ati or.al Dio ti :r.ar;
[Ref. 1*9] s
The point of time when it is decided whether an
affair or course of action shall proceed, be
modified, or terminate.
The immediate sequal to the culminating point of
a period of prosperity and rising markets at
which the business organism is severely strained
and forced liquidation occurs.
An unstable state of affairs in which a decisive
change is impending.
A psychological or sccial condition characterized
by unusual instability caused by excessive stress
and either endangering or felt to endanger the
continuity of the individual or his group.
The famous French Dictionary Z-rar.d larcusse Zr.cyclocedicue
[Ref. 15] provides partially similar definitions. The
interesting thing is that neither Webster nor larcusse re-
late crises especially to the military in combat as they
do for medicine, economics, and ether sciences or fields.
The New Columbia Encyclopedia even neglects all types of
crises except economic ones [Ref. •4-31 • Nevertheless,
military in combat face crises containing all important
aspects: psychological, sociological, physiological, economic,
technological, political and legal.
Of the above definitions, the third one seems to be the one
of most general applicability for this study, although
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it is not specific enough to give a sufficient idea of
the characteristics of crises.
The Encyclopedia Americana [Ref. 42] mentions under
"CRISIS" only the 16 political pamphlets by Thomas Paine and
cites the beginning sentence of the first pamphlet:
"These are the times that try men's souls."
This sentence, though sounding very dramatic, states in
fine and simple words the very true and important fact that
superior forces and abilities are needed to cope with arises,
and crises are therefore something extraordinary.
For the purpose of this thesis, there is no need tc
create a new definition, but it is important to stress the
relevant characteristics of crises:
- Crises disrupt formalized or normal procedures and
therefore represent extraordinary situations with
uncertain outcomes.
The risk is high that short and/or long term gcais
cannot be fulfilled or that even survival may be
impossible
.
- Extraordinary resources (capital, labor, material)
are necessary to solve crises. These additional
resources are at the upper limit or exceed these
available to the involved management level.
- In many cases several problems arise simultaneously
or in very quick sequence.
- In most cases there is a severe time constraint for
the decision-making process in the sense that crisis
12

situations deteriorate rapidly if adequate
countermeasures are not taken.
B. THE ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN CRISES
Four main elements act as variables in a crisis:
- The external environment
- The internal environment
- The crisis affected segment of the organization,
called the "crisis segment"
- The physical and/or psychological center of the crisis,
called the "crisis center"















The Crisis-Affected Organization and its Environment





Hall distinguishes between a general environment and
a specific environment.









The soecific environment or inter—organizational
relationship is composed of the organizations and individuals





The internal environment consists of all par~s of
the organization which are not directly affected by the
crisis
.
3 • The Crisis Segment
For this part of the organization, the crisis
criteria apply. It is assumed that the crisis segment is com-
posed of the following elements:
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- A leader or manager and his staff who are still
able to make decisions
- Crisis-affected subunits called crisis centers
which may or may not be able to make decisions at
their level
- Resources (capital, la'cor, material) that car. be
shifted in order to cope with crises. These
resources may or may not be sufficient
As can be seen in Figure 1, there might be seme
subunits in the crisis segment which are subordinated tc
the same leadership or management as are the crisis centers,
but which are not directly affected by the crisis. These
subunits, therefore, also belong to the internal envirenment
15

HI I NTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE CRISIS SEGMENT :F
THE ORGANIZATION A??D ITS ENVIRCN.^NT
A. DEVELOPMENT OF CRISES
Generally a crisis develops if an organization is, at
least for a certain time, unable to cope with its environment
in such a way that minimum short term or long term Dais can
be met. In many cases this even means a temporary inability
to assure survival. The reasons for crises development are
two-fold
:
- change in the environment
- changes within the organization.
1 . C hange in the Environment
Certain environmental factors such as technological,
political and economic conditions can change rapidly so that
the organization gets into crisis situations primarily be-
cause of the time constraints in coping with the change.
Other environmental factors will normally not change
rapidly, e.g. demographic, ecological or cultural conditions.
But even changes in these environments can lead to crises it
they are ignored over a long period of time or net recognized
by management. Only environmental factors that can change




It is important to recognize that the word "rapid"
has a very relative meaning. Depending on the kind of goals,
structures, investments and communications, environmental
changes will be perceived as rapid by some organizations,
while others will classify the same changes as slow. ?cr
example, the stockmarket is able to react within minutes to
changes in economic or political conditions, while shipbuild-
ers definitely need more time to adapt. Hence, the notion
"rapid change" will be used as it is perceived as such zy an
organization.
Below in a - i, a further descriptor, is presented on
how environmental factors might change.
a. Change in Technological Conditions
Breakthroughs in technology can change the
environment in a way which might be perceived as a rapic
change that can lead to crises, especially if the new tech-
nology was introduced by a competitor. Marketing might get
into deep trouble due to inability tc sell the gccds devel-
oped with the old technology. Production will fellow market-
ing due to obsolescence of raw materials, machinery, unfinished
and finished goods. Idle labor can cause additional serious
problems. If the technological breakthrough happened within
the organization itself, some effects might be opposite, e.g.
crisis in production due to the pressure fcr change to meet
increasing demand.
In the military, a change in technology can lead
to new kinds of threats which might create crisis situations
17

if adequate counterraeasures have not first been developed.
An extreme example is the development and engagement of
atomic weapons during WW II
.
b. Change in Legal Conditions
Changes in legal conditions normally are due to
changes in constitutions, laws and regulations. These
changes can work in two ways:
Deregulations might lead to crises in seme
organizations because protective features are eliminated and
competition becomes a major threat.
In our society, deregulations are outnumbered by
new laws and regulations which curb freedom. Restrictions
are imposed which can lead to crises in organizations be-
cause they require major changes, increasing the organiza-
tions' costs and eventually threatening its survival.
Examples: - Anti-pollution regulations require major
capital outlays for sewage systems, filter-
ing equipment, protection against radiation,
or they simply prohibit continuing operations.
(For example the operation of nuclear power
plants were prohibited by the peoples' vote
in Austria)
.
- Certain ingredients in food production are
prohibited due to discovered health hazards.




c. Change in Political Conditions
Especially in politically unstable countries,
conditions may be changed overnight by military coups or
other major events. This normally leads all organizations
which are in any way opposed to the new political leadership
into crisis. Even less dramatic changes can have severe
effects on organizations. For instance, political conditions
can have a major influence on laws and regulations, with the
effects as discussed earlier.
As Kail points cut:
The strong political pressures to reduce military
and aerospace spending have led to crises of one
sort or another for organizations in these areas.
Police departments are buffeted back and forth
between support for "law and ;rder" and condem-
nation of "police brutality." School systems have
drastically altered parts of their curricula in the
face of threats from groups concerned with such
topics as sex education or left-wing textbooks.
[Ref. IS, p. 30"7 ]
If "war is the continuation of politics by
different means," as was stated by the famous Clausewitz,
war represents an extreme political situation and may be the
ultimate source of any kind of crises. The following are
examples of such situations:
- scarcity of raw materials or labor
- reduced demand and therefore idle production
facilities
- increased demand in certain areas and there-
fore over-utilization of resources.




- physical destructions as a result of enemy
actions
.
d. Change in Economic Conditions
Economic conditions can change rapidly enough to
produce crises, especially in business-oriented organizations,
because of lagging demand and therefore idle production capa-
city, or on the opposite side, increased demand and over-
utilization of resources.
A change in economic conditions :ar. also have
major impacts on the availability of capital:
...commercial bankers must limit their risk taking to
situations that promise an acceptable return ::r the
risk of losses and the total relationship with the
customer. [Ref. 21, p. 220]
In deteriorating economic conditions , when
capital might be needed, for example, tc build up inventories,
the risk for the creditor becomes higher and his lean policy
probably tighter. This can lead tc crisis situati:r.s on the
debtor' s side
.
e. Changes in Demographic, Ecological or Cultural
Conditions
As was mentioned before, these factors do net
change so rapidly that an organization with a somewhat capable
management should get into trouble
.
On the other hand, rapid changes can be produced
artificially if businesses are transferred to other regions,
into different cultural settings or ecological conditions
without advanced and careful evaluation. This might happen
20

especially to multinational firms and produce crisis situa-
tions for the affected organization right from the beginning,
f. Change in the Specific Environment
The specific environment of an organization in-
cludes all other organizations and individuals with which
an organization is interacting. For a business organization
this might include:







For a military organization, this might include:




- Civil defense organizations
- Allied armed forces
- Hostile armed forces
Changes in the behavior and power of competitors or hostile
armed forces have the most potential for creating crisis in
an organization. Changes in other inter-organizational
relationships may also be responsible for a crisis, e.g., if
an important customer goes bankrupt or if a strongly affiliated
organization or individual gets involved in a scandal.
21

All the reasons discussed above, that may be responsible
for the development of a crisis in an organization, are not
clear-cut but are in steady interaction. In particular, all
changes in an organization's general environment might have
an influence on its specific environment.
2 . Change of Factors '.Vithin the Organization
According to Leavitt's organizational model [Ref. 3C
,





Because other variables are very important in dealing with
crises, two more are added:
- Capital (= monetary resources)
- Supply of goods (e.g. raw materials, military
supply)
For the following discussion in a - e about arises
due to changes in organizational variables, the notion "Task ,"
as mentioned in Leavitt's model, will be replaced by "goal,"
which might be more often used cy managers.
a. Change in Goals (or tasks)
Leavitt defines task briefly as "raison d'etre"
[Ref. 30, p. 1144]. Goals may include objectives which may
change without necessarily changing the overall aim.
A rapid change of goals might impose changes in
the composition of the labor force, in technology and also
22

in the organization's structure. The entire organization
might then be involved in changes. The resulting problems
for management may become so severe that the crisis criteria
are met. Examples:
A manufacturer of handcrafted period furni-
ture who, due to wartime, is forced to produce
wooden cases in large numbers, will experience
major changes in his entire business and very
probably face critical moments.
A military unit, trained for combat missions,
will have difficulties when it suddenly is engaged
in riot control.
b. Change in Actors (people)
Crises in an organization which result especially
from the people's behavior are in most cases due tc conflicts
between the actors. Conflicts may be created by problems in
interpersonal relationships vertically in the line manage-
ment chain or horizontally between peers, by job dissatisfac-
tion or other unsatisfied needs.
Because a conflict is both a form of aggression
and a frustration [Ref
. 31 .p-^13], crises may occur because of
aggressive actions of any kind: sabotage, arson, other acts
of physical destruction and strikes, all aimed at the
frustrating agent organization, or parts of it [Ref. 31. p. ^04]
If frustration is created by outside factors, displaced




Another way to look at development of crises
due to actors is based on the psychiatric "crisis theory"
where
Crisis is seen as a progressive phenomenon
manifested by continuously rising tension
due to the ineffectiveness of habitual
problem-solving methods. This leads to
feelings of helplessness, followed by
emergency mobilization of resources. [Ref. 3^.
p. 369]
Due to changed behavioral patterns, this psychological iis-
equilibrium of individuals and groups may then lead to crisis
for the organization.
It is important to notice that the meaning of
the expression "crisis," as it is used in ":risis theory,"





How changes in technology affect an organization
has already been described on page 17 . It should be recog-
nized that there is eventually a heavy influence of changes
in technology on the other organizational variables. As a
result of changes in technology, goals, composition of the
workforce and organizational structure might need to be
changed, creating severe problems for the entire organization.
d. Change in Structure
Different organizational structures can have a
heavy influence on the composition of the people within the
organization, the needed skills, interpersonal relationships
and power structures. People that are, for example, accustomed
24

to a vertically structured organization might not fit into a
matrix organization. As Davis and Lawrence point 3uts
It is inevitable, therefore, that a matrix organiza-
tion creates some "dinosaurs" - individuals who may
have been competent in a traditional organization
but do not want or cannot function in a matrix.
[Ref. 11, p. 113]
Inability of people to adapt to a different organizational
structure may well lead to crisis.
e. Change in Capital or Supply :f "oods
Change in this context means scarcity of capital
or supply of goods (e.g. raw materials, spare par* 3, ammuni-
tion, fuel, food) or changes in the composition of the gccds.
Such changes can obviously create very serious crises which
eventually can lead to complete collapse.
It is important to notice that changes in cr.e of the
above variables may influence other variables. Therefore,
if a crisis is caused in an organization ~zy internal factors
it is doubtful that the variable which, at first glance,
seems to be responsible for it, is really the one that caused
it. The interactions must be studied in crder tc determine
the real reasons.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the organiza-
tional variables may be changed by managerial decisions,
mistakes and internal development. But in most cases, they
change because of changes in the external environment. Hence,
the interdependence looks like that presented in Figure 2.
How crises can influence the environments (see lower darts),
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Figure 2
The Interdependence Between. External Environment,
Organizational yariables and Crisis
The organizational changes leading to crisis are
shown as having been affected by the external
environment. The crisis, on the ether hand, alsc
may have an influence on the environment.
B. IMPACTS OF CRISES ON THE ORGANIZATION
In what ways are organizations, especially the crisis
segments, affected by crises? This question will be answered
by looking at the main organizational variables again: goals,
actors, technology, structure, capital and supply goods.
1
. Impacts on Goals
The possible impacts on goals are:
- obsolescence of goals in quantitative terms
without changes in the qualitative aspects
of the remaining ones,
26

- obsolescence of goals in qualitative terms
without obsolescence in quantity,
- the combination of the two
The above impacts already show that decisions in
terms of goals have to be made in crisis 'oy a manager or
leader.
2 . Impacts on Installations, Equipment and Material
These impacts are generally of a physical nature and
occur especially during wartime or disasters, for example,
aircraft accidents, floods or nuclear accidents. Physical
damage does not always need to be an effect of crises but
can cause crises itself. It is difficult to draw a clear-
cut boundary between these two. The same is true for
physical impacts on people (see below).
3- Impacts on People
These impacts might be of physical, psychological,
physiological or social nature.
a. Physical Impacts
Physical impacts on people occur especially in
military units (losses, injuries) or at disasters in labor-
intensive organizations. They will subsequently have
psychological impacts and increase or cause crises. If, for
example, the enemy attacks a military unit and throws it out
of its positions, the crisis in the unit will be much worse
if many soldiers are killed.
27

The physical impacts become a special aspect in
decision making if they include leaders. Then, emergent
leaders will take over the leaderless group without appoint-
ment [Ref. 13. p. 6] or new leaders will be appointed. This
might result in both more or less difficulties for handling
the crisis situation, depending on the capabilities of the
new leader and the communication patterns. Anyway, increased
uncertainty will at the least exist over a limited time.
b. Psychological, Physiological and Scciai Impacts
These impacts are very important as they deter-
mine how crisis situations get solved. In crder tc get a
more detailed picture, four elements will be discussed:
- impacts on the leader or manager
- impacts on the staff
- impacts on the people in the crisis center
- impacts on the people in the internal
environment
(1) Impacts on the Leader or Manager . Crises
represent threat and danger on one side and, hopefully,
challenge on the other side. They are a danger and threat
to the leader or manager because of the great amount of un-
certainty they create. On the other hand, a good leader cr
manager is challenged by the possibility to prove himself in
fighting crises. What are the psychological effects of fear,
anxiety and challenge on the leader or manager?
Lindzey et al. state that the emotional
response to a specific perceived threat or danger is fear,
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and that the transitory response to something unknown or
indefinite in a specific situation is "state anxiety." They
claim that two ways exist to control the spread of fear. One
is to prevent the occurrence of the original fear stimulus.
This prevention is obsolete if a crisis has already occurred.
The other is to control fear by manipulating the consequences
of it [Ref. 31 1 PP- 383~38 /4'] • Viewed in the crisis context,
the relief promised by overcoming fear (and acting in a crisis
situation) must be more important than the expected results
of surrendering to it. State anxiety which results from
uncertainty can have a positive effect in making reactions
more effective but if it becomes excessive it may lead tc a
mental block [Ref. 31, pp. 38^-385].
F. Panse, who did extensive studies on
fear, anxiety and shock (Schreck) states that fear may cause
limitations of perception and consciousness, very similar tc
Baels's emotional paralysis (Baelz'sche Emoticnslahmung) . He
describes this paralysis as an appropriate form of reaction,
a basic instinct, which allows the individual to concentrate
his attention and to act, though narrowly focused en the
object of fear, with highest effectiveness. Another impact
of fear is the alteration in the perception of time. [Ref.
37, pp. 90-96, 121-131]
McDougall mentions the following drives
connected to fear:
- The drive to flee in order to protect oneself
- The drive to call (loudly) for help
29

- The drive to stay in a community or to seek one
- The drive to protect, to care
- The drive to dominate or maintain one's ground
- The drive to follow or to submit (quoted in Ref . 37,
p. 103).
The physiological impacts of the stress
created by anxiety and fear are very much interrelated with
the psychological ones. H. Selye distinguishes three phases
- Alarm reaction, causing, for example, pupil dila-
tion, increased heart beat, excretion of wastes,
increased galvanic skin response and increased
activity of the adrenal glands
- Stage of resistance to stress, recovering from
the alarm reaction
- Exhaustion (which is the exception) may occur iue
to continued reappearance of the symptoms of alarm
reaction [Ref. *K>, pp. 31-33, 113-12", and Ref. 31,
P- 377]
An overwhelming drive to flee or mental.
block may be the worst effects of those discussed above
which can happen to a leader or manager. Individuals in
leading positions, who react this way, should be replaced
immediately.
Challenge has quite the opposite effect.




There might be two reasons: First, threat
by enemy, competition, or whatever creates a basic rage
which turns into aggression as a possible basic reaction in
order to survive, although , as Lindzey et a! . state,
survival might not depend on being aggressive [Ref. 3-.
p. 3971- Aggression might even lead to overreactions or
misdirected reactions in crisis situations, endangering
adequate and effective crisis management. Possibly, the
best form of challenge is the emergence of a strong drive
in the leader or manager to overcome the crisis, leaving
him capable of objective judgment. This strong irive has a
considerable impact on all people influenced by the leader
or manager and is therefore extremely important, especially
in situations which seem to be hopeless.
Crises have not only the inherent threat
of uncertain outcome, but are also characterized by an over-
load of problems, and time constraints, hence, excess work.
This work overload, together with fear and anxiety creates
a real stress situation. Fiedler defines situational stress
We shall here define situational stress as a condition
in the environment which is experienced as threatening
and therefore as anxiety - and tension-arousing.
[Ref. 12, p. 199]
Cribbin describes stress as follows:
The common denominator of all stress and tension is a
feeling of discomfort Every human being has two
basic desires: to maintain psychological equilibrium
and harmony and to actualize his potential. Whenever
one perceives any threat to these drives, he experiences
a certain amount of stress. [Ref. 9» P- 200]
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The disequilibrium mentioned above may
range from hyperactivity to complete mental blocking. The
good leader or manager will react somewhere in between.
He will not be very sensitive to stress. Because it is
assumed that the manager or leader has to cope with temporary
crises only (as oppossed to permanent) , the long term impacts
of chronic stress will not be discussed here.
Another eventual impact on the leader or
manager, as a result of the above impacts, is a possible
change in his normal managerial behavior. ^s might derive
from his own uncertainty and result in leaving subconsciously
more authority to the subordinates, becoming r.cre democratic,
that is trying (also subsconsciously) ~o divide responsibility,
or becoming more autocratic.
That the behavior of leaders can ohar.ge from
situation to situation is supported by Fiedler and Chemers:
there is considerable evidence that the behavior
of leaders changes from situation to situation. The
leader who may be quite employee-centered and ocn-
siderate in situations in which he feels in complete
control tends to become concerned with the task in
situations in which his control of the group is
minimal. [Ref. 13, p. 5^]
(2) Impacts or. the Staff . What has 'oeer. said
for the leader or manager in (1) is also basically true for
the members of the staff. There is one major difference:
staff members do not have a direct responsibility. Evidently
this takes some pressure off of them.
Because a staff is composed of many pecple
with different personalities, the impacts of crises on a
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staff as a small organization may vary enormously. For the
leader or manager it is therefore important to knew how his
staff reacts in crises and especially the individuals having
special capabilities to work effectively in such situations.
If the leader or manager ignores the fact that the staff's
power structure can change in crisis situations, he might
become very disappointed and shaky.
The above mentioned drive to follow or to
submit will be an important factor in facilitating leader-
ship, because people are more willing to accept orders and
directions than is commonly supposed.
( 3) Impacts on the ?ecol~ 1 .-. the Crisis Center .
Leaders and their staff in the center of crisis will suffer
the same impacts as described in (1) and (2), although they
may be more severe and lead to complete inability :f action.
Where no appointed leaders exist any mere or where they have
lost their authority, power structures will change and
emergent leaders take over.
These extreme cases of crises occur es-
pecially in wartime situations where physical, psychological
and social impacts are combined to an extreme degree. X.
Lang provides a vivid description:
The disruption of combat units under fire is partly
the result of physical damage and medical incapacity
suffered in an unexpected emergency, both of which can
be "repaired." Other stresses on combat personnel
are cumulative. Men are required to undergo, as
part of their everyday activities, considerable
physical discomfort and other (for example, sexual)
deprivations. They suffer great 'uncertainty. In
particular, they constantly face the prospect of
being killed or seriously injured and witness death
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and injury to others. A continuous crisis pro-
duces attrition and the effects of attrition must
be distinguished from those of a nonroutine
emergency. The effectiveness of combat units is
impaired long before a point of irreparable physical
annihilation is reached. [Ref. 23, pp. 363-364]
In addition to that discussed above, two
elements may become crucially important: shock and panic.
In case of shock, dimming and change of consciousness seem
to happen relatively often. These shock effects can last
for hours or days. Studies of effects on people iue to
earthquakes have shown that a primary immobilization may be
followed by extreme motion (Bewegungssturm) . C e physio-
logical impacts are basically the same as caused by fear,
but they start more suddenly and their effects are more
intensive. Especially observed were all kinds of muscular
contractions.
Panic develops in the beginning :nly in
weak and psychasthenic individuals who show a lev/ resistance
level but may then suddenly and unforseeably spread, involv-
ing people who before were thoughtful. [Ref. 3? > PP- 117-
120, 151-154, 153]
(4) Impacts on the People in the Internal
Environment . If a part of the organization is in a crisis
situation, the psychological impact could take different
shapes. The overall attitude of the internal environment
might best be described by the question: "Will we be affected
too? If yes, in which way and when?" These basic questions
already indicate one element of crisis: uncertainty, which
can create anxiety and therefore have the same impacts as
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were discussed before. The additional fact of being in a
waiting position might even be worse because there is no
relief from the activity of fighting against an actual
"enemy" (= crisis). If leadership or management is function-
ing normally, preventive measures should emerge out of this
situation and lead to a tightening of the organizational
structure of the internal environment or just have the
opposite effect if leadership is weak and vacillating.
Another possible psychological impact is the
creation of willingness to help people in crisis. This will-
ingness to help does not only bring relief zz the helpee,
but also to the helper because a goal-directed activity re-
duces tension and fear [Ref. 37 i P- 53-
4. Impacts on Decision-Makini: Prccesse.-: I.,-:- ~
:
rgani national Struc tures
a. Tall Versus Flat Structures
The pyramidal shape of an organization is deter-
mined by the existing span of control or span of authority.
The span of control or authority can be defined as the
number of subordinates an executive permits to report tc him
directly [Ref. 2, p. 1-44], I vane evie h et al . describe tali
and flat as follows:
The larger the average span of control, the wider or
flatter is the organization, and the smaller the
average span of control, the narrower or taller is the
organization. [Ref. 22, p. 3^9]






Tall Versus Flat Organizational ructures
In a tall structure, oop management gets
involved earlier in crisis decision making,
but is able to shift resources
to the shorter line of command.
aster _^ue
In the tall structure, the line of command
is measured by the number of "communication centers"
(black points in Figure J, remark of author) through
which the directives of the chief executive pass in
being transmitted to the working level of the case of
the pyramid. [Ref. 2, p. 1-^5]
Crises may have different effects on tall and flat
organizations. Because of the fewer management levels,
the top management of a flat shaped organization will become
involved much faster in the crisis management than the one
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of a tall organization, which in this aspect has a more
stable structure. On the other hand, a flat organization,
due to shorter and therefore normally faster and better
communication from the bottom to the top, car. react in
shorter time than a tall one, allowing for a much faster
shift of resources to the center of the crisis. In a tali
organization, as a result of the numerous communication
centers, the risk is high that information may be delayed,
distorted or even lost.
b. Functional Versus Divisionalized Structures
Large organizations in particular, consist :f a
mixture of both structures. Divisionalization generally
goes along with the delegation of authority, hence, iivision
are to a great degree able to make their own decisions. In
a functional structure, decisions generally affect all cr
several departments. Therefore, the decisions have to be
made at a level which has the possibility and the power tc
coordinate the involved departments. This may be at a
relatively high level. A crisis therefore affects a
divisionalized structure probably only within one division
without necessarily involving top management. In a purely
functional structure, on the other hand, even if a crisis
occurs that affects a relatively small part of the business,
it is top management which has to make the decisions. This
has the advantage that all available resources of a firm
can be engaged, if necessary, and the decision certainly
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conforms to the ideas and policies of top management. That
may not be the case if decisions are made at divisional
level.
c. Highly Formalized Versus Less Formal Structures
Hage and Aiken state that "organizations with
routine work are more likely to have greater formalization
of organizational roles." [Ref. 17, p. 371] The extreme
type of formalization is the "Ideal Bureaucracy," as
described by Weber [Ref. ^S ] , '.-/here jcbs are highly routinized
and executed following specific rules. It is Dbvious that
such highly formalized organizations are too inflexible to
cope with crises, which by nature cannot be handled entirely
by formalized procedures. Lawrence and Lorsch checked the
relationship between organizational formalization and environ-
ment and found that the more certain the environment is,
the higher the formalization. [Ref. 29, y 1? 3--3-J It can
therefore be concluded that a less formalized Drganization
is more able to cope with a turbulent environment, hence,
with crises. In other words: the impacts of crises on a
less formalized organization will not be as severe as en a
highly formalized one.
d. Pure Hierarchical Versus Matrix Structures
Davis and Lawrence [Ref. 11, pp. 11-15] propose
that a matrix is the preferred organizationa
three conditions are met simultaneously:
- Outside pressure for dual focus




- Pressures for high information-
processing capacity
- Pressures for shared resources
These three conditions look similar to those expected in
a crisis.
Again Davis and Lawrence:
The matrix design, properly applied, tends to develop
more people who think and act in a general management
mode. [Ref. 11, p. 1?].
If this is true, matrix organizations might
have some advantages in handling : rises over the pure
hierarchial structure which may not be as flexible. As will
be pointed out later, flexibility, high information-process-
ing capactiy, and individuals with a general view ;f the
organization are crucial in resolving crises.
Matrix organizations alsc have their iisadvantages
The fact that individuals in a matrix Drganization have mere
than one superior, creates problems. The power between
superiors has to be brought to a reasonable balance which
sometimes is very difficult. Even if this talar.ee is
established, it can change rapidly and is therefore highly
unstable. I vane evie h et al . describe the situation vividly:
The participants are also faced with somewhat of a
dilemma. They may be responsible to both the func-
tional and program managers. This type of in-the-
middle position can create anxiety, stress and
frustration. Some people handle this dual respon-
sibility well, but others become very ineffective
and confused. [Ref. 22, p. 3& 7 J-
In conclusion, a matrix structure may be suitable to cope
with crises, given that the people involved are capable of
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handling this kind of structure. Otherwise there already
exists an organizational crisis or at least a human problem.
Additional difficulties produced by the crisis could lead to
a collapse
.
After this discussion of impacts on decision
making due to organizational structures, the question
arises: "Can crises have a direct influence on the organiza-
tional structure?" This question is not easy to answer. Ir.
most cases, organizational structures will ce changed by
managerial action in order to adapt to the special circum-
stances. On the other hand, it is certainly possible that
structures can change as a result of shifts in power result-
ing from loss of leaders and the upcoming of emergent leaders,
or breakdowns in the communication system. Hence, it can be
said that the impact of crises on an organizational structure
is of an indirect nature.
C. IMPACTS OF CRISES ON THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT










most may be influenced by crises, especially if crises are
perceived as disasters. The majority of these impacts have
long-term characteristics. For example, technology might
be improved after the explosion of a grain storage tank on
a farm, legal measures might be taken after a disaster in
a nuclear power plant, economic conditions might change
after a crisis at the stock exchange.
Political, demographic, ecological and cultural condi-
tions generally will only change as a result :: great crises
such as wars.
The possible impacts on the external environment should
normally be considered in crisis decision making at very
high levels only, where long-term impacts become important.
D. THE COMMUNICATION PROBLEM
M = superior command/management
level






Five communication channels are especially
important for decision making in crisis.
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Five communication channels are especially relevant to




- Communication between crisis center and the level
of leadership or management which is still a - -
to make decisions and has shiftable resources
(m in Figure ^) .
- Communication between the internal environment
and the crisis leadership or ~ar.agerr.ent level m.
- Communication between the external environment
and the leadership or management level m.
- Communication cetween the leadership ;r manage-
ment level m and its superior level M.
- Internal communi cations cetween the leader :r
manager and his staff and cetween the members
of the staff.
Communication is the excr.ange cf information. I: make
appropriate decisions, relevant information is necessary.
A. Toan Jr. lists and describes the following criteria
for good information:




- Bases for comparing current results
[Ref. W, pp. 6-11].
k2

In reality, the above criteria are goals which are seldom
entirely met. Information is too often biased.
Even in a normally functioning organization the infor-
mation flow is biased due to several facts. First, the range
and quality of perception of the individuals participating
in a communication process differ because of the different
quality of sense organs and limited perceptual channel
capacity [Ref. 31. P- 90]. Second, the communication process
of different individuals will vary considerably, depending
on factors such as:
- Personality of the partners involved in a oommunica-
tion process. Assuming that human action is heavily
influenced by the drive to satisfy needs, people
will follow this drive also while communicating.
For example a person whose basic need is harm avoidance
(one of Murray's Twenty 3asic Needs, Ref. 2>c
, pp. 15--
225) will tend to suppress for-varding information that
could in return create negative effects. Tr if a
superior has an aggressive personality, which creates
fear in his subordinates, he sets up a major barrier
to the transfer of knowledge and risks missing importan"
information.
- Trust or mistrust between communicating partners.
Mistrust is one of the most severe barriers to
communication between individuals and can have sub-
stantial impacts on the kind of information forwarded
and the way it is done.
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- Misuse of knowledge as a tool of power. Withhold-
ing information in order not to lose personal power
can mean that eventually vital knowledge does not
get forwarded. This might be responsible for
complete breakdowns of operations. A typical
example is the electrician in a manufacturing plant
who is the only one who knows about all of the changes
that have been made over the years in the electrical
system. If he is reluctant to properly record oner.,
he becomes a V.I. P. because nobody else will ever be
able to do anything meaningful in case of a power
failure
.
- Organizational barriers to communication. These
include awkward communication procedures, techni-
cally poor communication means and geographical
decentralization.
- Function of the individual in the organization.
Some functions need more interaction to fulfill
their job than others.
Third, different people will discriminate differently between
important and unimportant information. Therefore the entire
filtering process, which is crucial for the decision maker
becomes biased.
In a normally operating organization, the biases will
become apparent over time and automatically be corrected.
For example a military leader knows that unit commander "A"
tends to be too pessimistic and therefore gives reports

which describe the situation as worse than it is, while unit
commander "B" is very tough and does not like to admit that
he will be losing an important position. His reports,
therefore, tend to be too optimistic.
In crises, the situation will very probably change. Due
to the psychological impacts, people will eventually behave
differently, affecting their way of communicating. In
addition, especially in combat, institutional leaders may
be killed and emergent leaders take over. Though they
might be excellent, their way of handling information and
communication toward the higher level of command is unknown
right at the moment when the upper leadership level needs
accurate information most. In conclusion, this rr.ear.s that
the biases in communication during crises are different from
the biases during normal operations and therefore represent
an enormous problem in crisis decision making.
A typical example of the information problem is the
discussion by Subcommittee Chairman Gary Hart and Pennsylvania
Governor Dick Thomburg before a Senate panel following the
Three Mile Island A-plant accident in 197?:
Both Hart and Thomburg discussed confused and con-
flicting information of the accident. Thomburg
sharply criticized the handling of the crisis by
the Metropolitan Edison Co., the plant operator.
"The company issued statements in the early days
that proved to be something less than accurate and
its credibility as a reliable source of information
eroded rather quickly," the governor said.
[Ref. 35, p. 3J.
There is an additional aspect. Crises situations create
an increased information flow. As a result, there are some
dangers which can become very important:
^5

- The danger of communication overload for leaders or
managers because the participants in the communica-
tion system are not trained and accustomed to
filtering the increased information flow effectively.
Katz and Kahn state that:
Under time pressures the parts of the
communication difficult to decode are
neglected for the more easily assimilated
parts, even though the former may be
more critical for the organization.
[Ref. 2k, p. U.53].
- The danger of delaying important information because
no priorities are set.
- The danger of a complete blocking of the communica-
tion system, which in turn makes it impossible for
leadership or management to perform tasks effectively
- The danger of omissions, errors and distortions iue
to maladaptive behavior of involved people [Ref. 15,
p. 190, Ref. 2k, p. U-52].
Hence, it should be clear that communications which are
already of high importance under normal circumstances be-
come an absolutely crucial factor in crisis.
k6

IV. THS DECISION -.MAKING PROCESS
A. THE DECISION -MAKING PROCESS UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Different authors provide different decision-making
procedures. Examples:
Scanlan proposes four essential phases:
- Analysis of the problem
- Developing alternative solutions
- Analyzing alternatives
- Implementing the course of action to be followed
[Ref. 39, p. 11*0.
Basil develops a procedure which should especially fit
the non-mathematical approach to decision making:
- Identification of the problem
- Coordination of the problem with previous plans
and decisions
- Collection of factual information
- Determination of alternative courses of action
- Selection of one alternative (the decision)
- Formulation of a plan of action to implement the
solution
- Design of controls and implementation of the
decision
- Evaluation of the decision after its implementation
[Ref. 6, p. 152].
^7

Knudson, Woodworth and Bell present seven steps in
decision making:
- Definition of the problem or opportunity
- Fact gathering
- Development of alternative solutions
- Weighing of alternative solutions
- Selection of the solution
- Implementation of the solution
- Measurement of the consequences
[Ref. 26, p. 2391.
All of the above decision-making procedures have impor-
tant elements in common, even if their wording is iifferent.
The steps that can be identified throughout are:
- Identification of the problem
- Determination of alternative courses 22 action
and their evaluation
- Selection of one alternative which is the
decision
- Implementation of the decision which includes its
later evaluation
In order to be able to relate the basic decision-making
process better to the specific conditions in a crisis, the
above sequence will be developed more in detail to ensure
that important steps are not left out. Every step is
discussed only briefly, assuming that a normal decision-making




- Identification and analysis of the problem.
What is the problem? What is its scope? How does
it influence the variables of the organization?




Can something be done to save time or to reduce the
most disagreeable crisis effects immediately, with-
out anticipating the later decision?
- Analysis of the environmental influence on the problem.
What influence does the external general environment
have on the problem now and over time (technological,
legal, political, economic, demographic, ecological
or cultural conditions) and how can it be influenced?
What influence can the external specific environment
have on the problem now and in the future (organisa-
tions with which the one organization is in interaction,
especially competitors, enemies, government agencies,
related businesses or allied forces) and how can it
be influenced?
What influence can the internal environment have
on the problem now and over time (e.g. other de-
partments, divisions, military units) and how can
it be influenced?
* It is important that conclusions are made which will




Determination of the time frame which is available
to solve the problems.
This is a result of the preceding steps.
Third conclusion:
Determination of alternative courses of action.
If the preceding steps were made carefully, the
alternative solutions should be easy to find. It
is important to list only a few (three to four), but
really different and feasible courses of action.
Each alternative has to be evaluated. Advantages,
disadvantages and time frame must be pointed out
and their impacts on all environments must be
estimated
.
Selection of the best alternative as the solution
to the problem.
"Best" often describes the solution with the
least disadvantages.
Implementation of the solution.
This includes the orders to subordinates, the
provision of the necessary resources and the
evaluation of the execution.
It is worthwhile to give a second thought tc
how the orders can be given under the prevailing
circumstances and to develop a concept for the
relevant testing of the implementation.
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The above decision-making procedures are intended to
handle one problem at a time. If there are several problems,
they should be solved in sequence by repeating the same
procedure
.
B. THE DECISION -MAKING PROCESS UNDER CRISIS CONDITIONS
The major characteristics and impacts of crises that are
relevant to the decision-making process are listed below in
the form of keywords. They represent a short summary of the
discussions in earlier chapters and are the special factors




- Uncertain outcome with survival at risk
- Necessity for extraordinary resources
- Multiple simultaneous problems
- Severe time constraints
- Obsolescence of goals or objectives
- Destruction (people, installations, equipment, material)
- Stress (anxiety, fear, shock, panic, work overload)
- Change of power structures
- Change in communication and information
Obviously there are many cause and effect relationships
and interactions between the above factors. In order to
show how the decision maker must cope with these interacting
problems, they will be grouped for the following discussion,
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although it is obvious that they cannot be treated indepen-
dently. The grouping is only done for structuring purposes.
1 . Fear, Anxiety, Stress, Shock, Panic
The reduction of fear and state anxiety is one of
the most important actions a leader or manager should take
as a preliminary measure in decision making. Before taking
any further steps, he must do everything to reestablish firs -
his own psychological equilibrium which might have been
distorted by the actual stress situation.
Figure 5 shows how J. J. Cribbin describes the ad-
justment procedure (adapted)
:
on-going behavior is blocked
manager is stirred up
i
various ways to overcome the




adaptive behavior maladaptive behavior
i I
resolves disequilibrium short term drive reduction
and need satisfaction, but
no lasting solution
Figure 5
Procedure for Adjustment to Stress
as Proposed by J. J, Cribbin
[Ref. 9, pp. 204-205].
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The leader or manager of course wants to resolve
his disequilibrium. Two questions arise. The first is:
What are "various ways to overcome the thwarting situation?"
Cribbin indicates that the scope ranges from "dogged effort
based on logical experimentation to random illogical behavior
or stereotyped repetition of ineffective actions." [Ref. 9,
p. 204] . Depending on one's personality, different ways
may lead to the regaining of equilibrium. Some people will
find support in their religion, others in increased communi-
cation with superiors, peers or subordinates, others in
distraction, some in mental exercises, as for example, com-
paring their actual problem to the billions of stars, the
enormous distances and the incredible timeframes of the
universe in order to become aware hew very unimportant and
tiny the actual problem is. In addition, mere and mere
individuals are becoming aware of the different techniques
which are available to reduce tensions, such as relaxation
and meditation techniques. It is beyond the scope of this
thesis to discuss tension- reducing medication. The second
question is: '//hat are the criteria for adaptive and mal-
adaptive behavior?
Again Cribbin:
Since adjustment entails the balanced sat-
isfaction of needs, the manager must treat his
difficulties as interrelated. If the solution
found does not result in a higher degree of
personal integration - and this is always rela-
tive - then one need or pattern of needs will
be met at the expense of others equally important.
[Ref. 9, p. 205].
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As nonintegrating (maladaptive) adjustments, Cribbin
describes measures that violate normal social standards. He
mentions three major forms: recourse to aggression, with-
drawal (from people or problems), and self-deception (to
save face and maintain self-respect) [Ref. 9. ?• 205].
Adaptive and maladaptive tension-reducing procedures
will be repeated, because both give relief, although the
one resulting from maladaptive behavior has short-term
characteristics. It is therefore important to have leaders
and managers who are adaptive, because they will be mere
effective in handling crisis situations. The experience ::
several successfully managed crises will in addi~i:n increase
self-confidence and therefore reduce fear and anxiety right
from the beginning.
Once the leader or manager has reestablished his
psychological equilibrium to a level which allows him to act
effectively, he must ensure that fear and anxiety are reduced
within his subordinates, including the staff. If staff or
crisis center should be of primary concern to him , depends
on the situation. Because anxiety is a result of uncertainty,
the latter should be reduced by good and quick information.
Since the mood of the people involved in a crisis can deterior-
ate rapidly, if uncertainty prevails, the time factor in
providing information is important. Both anxiety and fear,
the emotional response to a specific, perceived threat, can
be reduced by creating, or better maintaining confidence in
leadership. Positive, earlier experiences with leaders or
5^

managers will be a good platform for confidence. An
extremely effective way to reduce fear, shock, and panic is
the personal presence of the obviously "cool-looking" leader
right in the crisis center.
The importance of a leader's personal presence and
influence is stressed in an abundant amount of relevant
literature. A typical example is described in Torrance's
study about group behavior of Air Force personnel:
In one crew, the navigator became panicky but
looked up and saw the aircraft commander and
the pilot were still in their seats ioir.g their
jobs and he became calm. [Ref. 45 , p. 53 J
•
This effect works in both ways, the positive and the
negative. In an unstable psychological situation, the action
of one individual can turn the whole situation into good
or bad.
Panse too emphasizes the importance of the suggestive
example given by strong leaders although he points cut -hat
their influence is limited to people who dispose of some
minimum substance of personality (rersbnlichkeitssubstanz)
,
consistency of character and strength of will [Ref. 3~ >
pp. 119-120].
Torrance found evidence for the importance of
setting goals and clarifying structures to a group in crisis:
Having a common goal is a force which helps to
hold together in a survival emergency. [Ref. 45,
P- 7531-
Survivor group behavior shows that relief and
behavior of increased survival value results
when the structure of the situation becomes
clear. [Ref. 45, p. 752].
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The findings are certainly applicable to a staff
in crisis, but may, in essence, also be valid for larger
groups
.
Initiating activity is another effective means to
reduce anxiety, fear, shock and panic. Being charged with
duty absorbes attention and affect, hence, leaves less room
for emotions [Ref . 37, p. 51 •
In addition, the leader or manager must be aware that
anxiety and fear, if repressed or treated as a trifle by
the crisis-affected individuals, create a strong need to
communicate about the suppressed feelings [Ref. 3". I?
.
11-12]. He therefore should try to satisfy this need.
In most cases of crises the leader or manager must
decide where his influence is more important in order tc
most effectively fight crisis, if it is either in the iecision
making process with his staff or right in the center :f the
crisis. This decision depends mainly on the personality :;
the leader or manager on the one hand and the capabilities
of the staff on the other. If the staff is led by a capable
individual, who knows how to act in his master's spirit, the
leader should go to the crisis center. Many leaders act
this way but forget to establish an effective communication
back to their headquarter, to inform the staff about decisions
they made on the spot, in order to integrate them in the
staff's planning, and to get continuously important infor-
mation from the staff.
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It may seem that the above discussion has not much
to do with decision making. This certainly is not true,
is very difficult to implement a decision, even if it is an
excellent one, if the subordinates are unable to execute it
due to their disastrous psychological condition. Hence, it
is absolutely necessary to first prepare a favorable base.
2 . Multiple Simultaneous Problems and Time Cor.strair.~s
If several problems arise at the same time, or in
very short intervals, and there is no time constraint in
solving them, they may be solved by normal iecision-making
procedures. It is the combination of multitude and time
constraints which creates special organizational problems,
besides the stress involved.
Two steps are especially important when one deals
with such situations:
- Structuring the problems
- Creation of an adequate decision-making organization
a. Structuring the Problems
Structuring the problems involves the following
steps: First, all problems should be ranked in their primary
relative contribution to achieving the overall goals. The
problems of a major production line are, for example, basically
more important than the ones of a small line. Second, ail
problems should be evaluated for their impact on achieving the
goals over time and ranked following time priorities. Third,
the combined ranking of the problems must be made. In real
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life it often is difficult to make the needed discrimina-
tions, because tradeoffs become necessary. Example: An
infantry division has lost two key forward positions,
previously held by a regiment, to the enemy. This means that
the enemy is able to continue his attack on the rear regi-
ments within the next few hours. At the same time ~r.e in-
telligence service reports that the two bridges, which are
vitally important to the supply line, have ceer. occupied by
two enemy airborne companies. This is especially bad because
the already delayed antitank-ammunition supply is urgently
needed within the next six hours. In addition, a rear
infantry battalion reports the outbreak of typr.cii fever,
with 30% of the battalion already affected.
Following step one, the ranking of problems
would be
1. Loss of regimental positions
because it concerns primarily a
combat regiment, hence a major unit
2. Typhoid fever
because it concerns primarily a
combat battalion, also a major factor
3- Antitank ammunition
because it concerns the supply organization
Step two reverses the order as follows:
1
. Antitank ammunition
because the severe time constraint
affects the overall goals of the division
58

2. Loss of regimental positions
because if no measures are taken in time,
achievement of the overall goals might
he endangered
3- Typhoid fever
Although this problem could be the
major one in the long nan, it isn't in
the short term.
The combined ranking remains as it was after
step two, due to the major importance of the time frame in
this example.
And fourth, in structuring the problems, the
interaction between the different problems must be determined.
Some problems will have a lot of interaction with others,
some will have less .and some ncne. This step is especially
important for organizing the further decision-making process.
Fifth, it should be determined if there are
problems that can be discarded because they are relatively
unimportant and the staff is unable to handle them without
negative impact on the major problems.
Sixth, the remaining problems must be scanned
for obsolescence, i.e., problems that cannot be solved due
to lack of time or means. Spending resources on such problems
must be avoided, even if this is hard to do (for details see
page 68).
Appendix I provides a practical overview for
the above discussed procedures.
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If the problems are so complex that they cannot :e
structured without further investigation, a preliminary
evaluation should be made involving the staff in an organiza-
tion similar to one of those described in (1) or (2)
below.
b. Creation of a Decision-Making Organization
Or How to Organize the Staff
The goal of a special staff organization, establish
ed for decision making in crises, is to create favorable
conditions for solving the multitude of problems in a short
time
.
There are two basic ways to attain this goal.
Either the problems are solved in sequence, reducing the
time for solving each problem to the lowest possible minimum
or the problems are solved simultaneously.
( 1) Staff Organization for Decision Making in
Sequence . In order to make this type of decision making
work, extremely high efficiency is necessary, because the
time available to solve one problem gets very short. This
can be done by chosing some very capable "generalists" who
form a "nucleus." At the same time, all other staff members
are organized in a pool of specialists where they remain at
the disposal of the nucleus (Figure 5) . This eliminates all
the hazards of overstaffing, which wastes a lot of time. M.
Folsom states:
Generally, small groups of highly qualifed staff
people seem to work out best.
Over-staffing can be suspected when non pertinent in-
formation is frequently brought up, when issues often
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become confused, and when decisions are too often
delayed - and particularly when all three symptoms
exist at once. [Ref. 1^, p. 23]
•
There are additional advantages to having
a small number of "generalists" working on decisions:
- fewer coordination problems
- concentration on important factors, hence







Staff Organization for Decision. Making in 5ecuer.ce
In order to speed-up the decision-making
process, the acting staff is reduced to a
few capable "generalists." All other
staff members are pooled to provide
special information, if necessary.
It is difficult to say how large the "nucleus" should be.
Slater found five to be an ideal number [cited in Ref. 20, p.361]
Excellent "generalists," assisted by capable secretaries,
can act very effectively.
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The preceding system does have some major
disadvantages
:
- Important details which are known by the specialists
can get lost and have unexpected impacts later. This
can partially be eliminated if specialists are invited
to give a very short comment on the final decision in
the sense "ok" or "not ok."
- The staff members who are excluded from the nucleus
get frustrated.
- Staff members who are known for their nonconforming
opinions, are normally excluded from the nucleus in
order to save time. Hence, the critical evaluation
during the decision-making process is missing
- The information of the pool of specialists normally
is neglected by the nucleus due to lack of time.
Hence, if something happens to the small group, the
rest of the staff will have a harder time taking
over the functions.
( 2) Staff Organization for Parallel Decisio
Making. The basic idea is delegation of additional authority
to task forces within the staff, eventually including line
people in order to be able to solve problems simultaneously
and effectively.
W. Bass describes the task force concept
to meet emergencies as follows:
Business firms and government agencies resort often to
task forces to respond to crises . . . The stress of the
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emergency calls forth vigorous efforts from all sides,
under the eye of the top management. Initiative and
creative thinking are encouraged. Channels of communi-
cation are forced open among operating departments. The
organization is operating as a whole instead of as a
collection of isolated units. Necessity breaks down
the barriers between cells of responsibility and
expertise. [Ref. 7, p. 1].
Gruber and Miles have a similar basic idea
about task forces:
The creation of a task force should imply an effort to
improve a serious problem situation or to realize the
potential in an important opportunity, since task-force
members have jobs in the regular organization structure.
[Ref. 16, p. 179].
Some fundamental principles of authority
delegation become even more important in crises:
- Relationship of trust between superiors and sub-
ordinates involved in the delegation
- Clear policies which provide "he framework for
decision making at every level
The principal task of policies is to give consistency
to decisions while still allowing different decisions
on different sets of facts to be made. Policies thus
furnish the framework for plans. There is consequently
a close relationship between policies and delegation
of authority. [Ref. 2, p. 1-^9]-
- Ability of the recipients of authority to overview
not only their specific problem but also its inter-
actions with other ones
Although
an orderly process of authority delegation always
assumes that authority, responsibility and account-
ability are coextensive and inseparable [Ref. 2,
p. 1-41],
this principle often must be violated, because a leader or
manager sometimes cannot delegate responsibility and
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accountability in crises but has to delegate authority alone.
Since this represents a major risk to him, the before-mentioned
trust factor is so highly important - trust based on integrity,
loyalty, and capability of the subordinates.
Obviously, the personality of the leader
or manager becomes very important and so dees his leader-
ship style. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss
leadership styles extensively, but it :ar. be safely stated,
that the extreme authoritarian style and "laissez-faire"
leadership are not compatible with effective delegation of
authority. Argyris showed that the latter creates mere
tension and anxiety than does either democratic or autocratic
[Ref. k, p. 192]. Organizations built around an authoritarian
leader on the other hand have inherent weaknesses:
An authoritarian leader is quite likely to find, for
one thing, that his followers have deserved him in a
critical moment. He can hold around him only those of
uncritical minds and dependent personalities . .
.
When that one man goes, the entire organization is
likely to collapse, for such a leader has not allowed
others to develop enough to replace him and tc keep z'r.e
organization's executive resources strong. [Ref, 33 <
p. ^96].
The organizational procedure of delegation
is based on the results of the problem structuring process
which is described in Appendix I. The latter makes clear
which are the problems to deal with, their ranking and
interdependence
.
Problems with no interaction can be solved
independently by a staff task force or by line people.
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Problems which are interrelated with other
problems require a coordinated effort by the leader/manager,
chief of staff or a special coordination task force.
The task forces should be composed of at
least one "generalist" and the necessary specialists in
order to solve the problems effectively.
Sometimes there are not enough competent
specialists to satisfy each task force. This might be the
case with financial experts, computer specialists or communi-
cation specialists. If these specialists have to make con-
tributions to several task forces, they should be put into a
pool of specialists. Special attention has to be paid to
members of such pools in order to keep their knowledge up
to date and to make sure that they do not confuse the
different problems, but keep them well separated in their
minds
.
Figure 7 shows relevant parts of the organi-
zational structure for parallel decision making, "cased :r.
step 6 of Appendix I
.
In spite of the incorporation into ~ask
forces, staff members should continue to help the line,
because
staff departments are supposed to assist line depart-
ments in work that requires technical expertise and
detailed attention. [ Ref . 19, p. 112].
In conclusion, task forces might work under
four kinds of conditions:
of

- Task forces which can solve problems independently
and do not require assistance from an information pool
(problem F in Figure 7)
- Task forces which can solve problems independently but
need information from the pool of specialists (problem
C in Figure 7)
- Task forces which solve problems that need coordination
but do not need to use the pool of specialists (problem
E in Figure 7)
- Task forces which solve problems that need coordination
and require inputs from the pool of specialists (pre clem




















*has to keep impacts
of problem D in mind
Figure 7
Relevant Parts of the Organizational Structure for
Parallel Decision Making (Compare Appendix l7
Task forces attack the different problems. Where
necessary, coordination is imposed and knowledge of
specialists is provided. Problem 3 is dropped be-
cause it is of minor importance; problem D is obsolete,
hence also discarded, but still affects problems A, E,
and the "normal operations."
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It is obvious that problems which can be
treated the first way are the ones that might best be
delegated down the line
.
The chief of staff (or leader, manager)
who has organized his staff into task forces must now give
clear orders to the task forces and clearly define the range
of authority, responsibility and accountability he delegates
and which decisions he wants to make by himself. If the
delegated authority involves the power to give orders to
subordinate levels, these levels must be informed.
If the delegation is done, the responsible
chief of staff (leader, manager) has to reorganize his own
activity following the new organization. From the viewpoint
of primary importance and time, the highest-ranking problems
need his attention most. From the organizational viewpoint,
the task forces that deal with problems that need coordination
and rely on the pool of specialists require the most control.
Hence, trade-offs have to be made.
Parallel problem solving by delegation
normally involves most members of the staff, and eventually
also some individuals from the line, and allows ail of them
to contribute in solving the crisis. It is, therefore, a
much more satisfying procedure from the human resources view-
point than the one described in (1).
The decision-making procedures within the
task forces follow normal rules, as described in IV.
A
(pages 47-51)i except that there is eventually a more pronounced
lack of information than usual.
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3. Additional Resources, Obsolescence and Time Constraints
Measures aimed at coping with crises often require
substantial amounts of additional resources. On the other
hand, due to the prevailing uncertainty, benefits are difficult
to estimate and can decrease rapidly if timely crisis counter-
measures are not taken. It is, therefore, extremely im-
portant that a cost/benefit analysis for a relevant future
period is made for each planned measure. If the measures
cannot be effective before the point of obsolescence, or the
costs are higher than expected benefits, the measure should
be dropped in order to save resources (Figure 3) . So-called
"alibi actions" which are taken, even if they make no sense,
in order to show that at least some attempt has been made to









The Problem of Obsolescence
It should be determined if the effects of
applied resources will take place early





If a grounded supertanker is expected to burst within the
next ^ hours and it takes 30 hours to pump the oil out of
it, all pumping measures are a waste of time, labor and
capital. Hence, the specific solving of such problems must
be discarded, without neglecting their interactions with
other problems.
The psychological impacts in crises, together with
changed procedures may have a "wasting effect" on some
people. Resources are wasted due to the opinion "our losses
are so huge and the situation so hopeless anyway, that it
really does not matter if double the needed explosives are
used to do the job." The other extreme is the stupid
bureaucrat who, while fire spreads, wants a receipt before
handing out a fire extinguisher to an employee of another
department. Two measures are important in fighting the
"wasting effect." First, leaders or managers in crises must
clearly define which normal procedures are changed and,
second, managerial control must be tighter than in normal
times
.
On the other hand, special allowances must be made
because the additional necessary resources normally cannot
be spent in an optimal way due to the lack of fine-tuned
planning. There certainly exist situations where the appli-
cation of too few resources has the inherent risk of total
failure. Hence, when in doubt: be massive, not meager.
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4. Communication and Information
Everything must be done to get accurate information
in order to be able to make appropriate decisions. Hence,
measures must be taken to fight lack of information, extreme
bias of information and excess information.
In some crisis situations it is of vital importance
that information is procured fast and aggressively. This is
the case when there is some evidence that important facts
could get lost or be intentionally destroyed. If, for
example, a business gets into troubles due tc illegal actions
of a subsidiary, immediate actions must be taken to avoid
destruction of incriminating documents and the disappearance
of involved people.
If the information and communication center is unable
to handle the information overload, it might be worthwhile
to delegate a "generalist" in order to assure effective
filtering.
Because people in crises are often unable tc act as
objective information sources, it may be necessary to estacii:
a special information service, consisting of teams sent out
to the crisis center (see also 5»c on page 77). If this is
not possible, for time reasons or other, it may be necessary
to make decisions under conditions of high uncertainty.
Yet the pitfalls of problem analysis and decision making
are almost certain to increase whenever a manager is
under pressure ... It is precisely at this time, when
people are clamoring for action, when he doesn't have
all the important information he thinks he needs . .
.
The good manager, like a skilled detective, will spot
the relevant information and use it, point by point,
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to narrow down the search for the real culprit.
[Ref. 25, pp. 24-251-
Some mathematical models, which deal with decision making
under risk, uncertainty and conflict, may be applicable











[Ref. iJ7, p. 48].
Methods which use estimates developed by experts may also
be helpful. The best known procedure probably is the Delphi
Method [Ref. 32, Ref. 10].
To avoid new biases in communications due *o person-
alities, the following recommendations should be accepted:
First, the adoption of a new staff organization
should not create new internal communications. This means
that the heads of task forces should have collaborated with
the chief of staff (leader, manager) before, and that the
members of the task forces should have worked together in
advance. The creation of special "disaster staffs," composed
of people who normally do not work together, is therefore
problematic unless these staffs get frequent training.
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Second, communications between crisis command or
management and the crisis center must be examined so that
biases due to impacts on the people who are directly affected
by the crisis (physical damage, psychological impacts) can
be dealt with effectively. If there is some reason to be-
lieve that things have changed, "emergency command or
management teams," composed of competent staff members should
be sent to the crisis center in order to establish reliable
communications. This helps not only in transmitting infor-
mation both ways but also in implementing decisions (see
also 5-c on page 77).
A special problem is the staff's internal updating of
information in order to avoid having work done that is based
on obsolete information. As things change quickly in crises,
an effort must be made to spread information rapidly. This
can be done best by organizing frequent staff meetings and/or
frequent updating of data bases.
A very dangerous aspect is described by M. Folsom:
There is also a tendency by seme staff men to shield
their bosses from unpleasant news and contacts. Such
protection can often go too far and prevent the execu-
tive from gaining pertinent information or learning
of alternative points of view. [Ref. 14, p. 25].
The same situation occurs when the authoritarian or
aggressive personality of a leader or manager creates fear
within his subordinates of passing information upward.
Crisis situations often become worse due to the
lack of controlled information flow to the mass media. This
is especially true for public administrations or big businesses
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that are always observed with scepticism by the public. Fast
and accurate information by management can avoid unpleasant
rumors. Withholding information or providing intentionally
false information does not normally pay off, because mis-
trust and unfavorable public opinion is created when it be-
comes obvious that false information was delivered. Hence,
good public relations are an important part of crisis managemen J
In all these information and communication problems
involved in crises, the protection of information against
undesired dissemination becomes an important aspect. It
is, therefore, necessary to implement security measures for
staff people and to take steps against the tapping of communi-
cation systems in advance because there is probably no time
to do it once a crisis has developed.
5- Other Aspects , resulting from several factors
a. Lack of Critical Evaluation
Many leaders and managers, especially authoritarian
ones, do not like people in their staff who express different
points of view or have different approaches to problems.
Enormous pressure on staff members for conformity with the
"group opinion," or the leader's opinion, may exist.
As the individual acts in interpersonal behavior events,
in face-to-face contact with the other group members,
he is often placed under group pressure to conform -
to judge, believe, act in agreement with the judgment,
belief and action of the group. [Ref . 27. p- 505]-
Especially under conditions of time constraint, people who
resist conformity, risk being excluded from decision making
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in order to avoid conflict and to save time. Individuals
with a critical attitude are often not included when new
staff members are selected. Pressure for conformity and
elimination of non-conforming opposition leads to the extremely
dangerous situation of " groupthink, " as described by I. L.
Janis. He mentions the following symptoms of "groupthink:
"
- Illusion of invulnerability which leads to over-
optimism, the willingness to take extraordinary
risks, and failure to respond to warnings
- Collective construction of rationalizations in
order to discount warnings and other forms of
negative feedback
- Belief in the inherent morality of the ingroup
which leads to ignorance of ethical and moral
consequences of decisions
- Stereotyped views of the leaders of the enemy
groups, for example, they are stupid cr evil, hence,
the failure to get a realistic, sophisticated
picture
- Pressure on members who support other opinions
than those of the majority
- Self -censorship by avoiding deviation from
apparent group consensus
- Mindguarding in order to protect the leader and
the fellow members from adverse information
[Ref. 23, pp. 44-46, 7^-75].
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It is obvious that poor decision making is the
result of groupthink. Hence, an effort has to be made to
allow critical evaluation to take place, ever, if there are
time constraints. Asch found experimental evidence that
the presence of a partner supporting a dissident depleted
the group's majority of much of its power. In addition, he
concluded that the dissent per se increased independence.
[Ref. 5, P- 3^]
The effective leader or manager should therefore
tolerate more than one individual in his staff who is known
to have independent viewpoints, in order to increase the
individual's ability to resist pressure for conformity . He
may also encourage them to express their opinion, tecause
it. (Asch' s finding, the author) suggests, for ex-
ample, that a dissident opinion, if expressed loudly
and clearly, can have a tremendous effect in strength-
ening the independence of like-minded people. The
expression of a dissident opinion may not change the
majority's beliefs, but it can conserve the minority
view. [Ref. 24, pp. 5J.4-515]
In addition, the following remedies may help
to prevent groupthink:
- Assignment of the role of a critical evaluator to
each group member
- Assignment of the role of a devil's advocate to at
least one group member
- Avoidance of statements about preferences and expecta-
tions by the leader before the decisions are made




- Discussion of the group's deliberations with outside
members of the organization, if time and security
permits this
- Eventual involvement of outside experts, if conditions
allow it
- Division into subgroups after preliminary consensus,
reevaluation of the solutions, then group meeting to
discuss residual doubts
The above recommendations are adapted from Janis
[Ref. 23, p. 76].
b. Delegation of Authority to Management Levels
Down the Line
In general, it is advisable to delegate as
much authority as possible to line people who are in the
crisis center and therefore have the best knowledge of the
facts. This delegation of authority can include subordina-
tion of additional resources. Several conditions must be
fulfilled to maice such delegations.
First, the command or management level in quesxio]
must be able to act in spite of the on-going crisis.
Second, it must have no responsibility for the
occurance of the crisis, otherwise it might spend resources
on eliminating facts that could be used as evidence in later
investigations. This is especially important when criminal
acts are the reason for crises. In this case, the involved
management level should immediately be isolated and replaced.
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c. Emergency Command or Management Teams
If lower leadership or management levels are
unable to fulfill their function because of crisis impacts,
emergency command or management teams must take over the
responsibilities. These teams should be composed of flexible,
capable people who are able to grasp the problems quickly,
establish the necessary contacts, gather the important infor-
mation and make decisions. They must get the necessary
authority and resources to act as independently and effective-
ly as possible. Finally, they must generate efficient vertical
and horizontal communications.
d. Resistance to Change
As with other people in organizations, staff
people have the tendency to do what they have always done.
It is certainly a pitfall to expect flexibility in crisis
situations when there was none before
.
Role performance becomes so firmly habituated and
closely prescribed by expectations relating to
function and status that the members are unable to
act freely in coping with the changing situational
demands made upon the group. [Ref . 41, p. 133]
Nevertheless, there may be some members of the
staff who are able to respond to the changed procedure
patterns of a crisis. In highly formalized organizations,
which operate in stable environments, one probably should
look for frustrated people, planning to leave soon because
they cannot develop their dynamic personality. Organizations
that are used to operating in turbulent environments will have
less difficulties in providing flexible people.
77

It is clear then that executives should find out
early which members of their staff are capable of adapting
to changing situations. However, it is best not to change
established procedures in crises without obvious necessity.
e. Help From Outside
Depending on the character of a crisis and the
reasons for its development, willingness to help can be
expected from the internal and external environment. Crisis
leadership or management must include these potential resources
in their decision making and coordinate them with their
own resources.
f. Power Struggling
People who are known fcr their reckless egoistic
power struggling should be eliminated from decision making in
crises because they lessen the efficiency of the process.
g. Collective Leadership
If the leadership or management involved in a
crisis is a collective one, meaning it consists of several
persons with equal power, including the chairman who is only
"primus inter pares," the following things may happen:
- The individuals with "strong" personalities may emerge
and take over authoritarian leadership
- The collective leadership or management may be willing
to take higher risks than an individual, as shown by
J. Stoner [cited in Ref . 38, p. 3S5]
- The decision may almost certainly be delayed .hisis
due to set-up time, start-up time, and disucssion time
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[Ref. 38, page 3951- The quality of the decision may
be better than the decision made by a single individual,
but this is uncertain [Ref. 38, pp. 379-384].
Because these unforeseeable effects may hamper
the decision-making process in crisis, the most capable
individual in the group should be designated as superior and
given the additional necessary authority.
h. Implementing Decisions
Basically there is no major difference between
implementing decisions under normal and crisis conditions.
Nevertheless, two factors are more important in crises:
First, the psychological aspect of how to im-
plement solutions to problems can be of vital importance.
Measures aimed at fighting crises normally require unusual
efforts and sacrifices and are therefore not popular. Hence,
implementation is a delicate affair and should not be
neglected by the decision maker. The best people must get
involved in this important step.
David Lilienthal, former director of TYA, under-
lines the importance of the implementation step:
There is an unfortunate lack of distinction between a
plan and accomplishment . . . Too many business people
- and government administrators - believe 'We have a
plan, therefore the job is done.' Most of the time
what we need ... is a simple answer ~o 'How do we get
it done - now.' [cited in Ref. 3, p. 157]
Second, tight control becomes extremely important
as it not only helps leadership or management to check




V. CONCLUSION: AN INTEGRATIVE DECISION -MAKING MODEL
Appendix II shows the entire decision-making process
graphically and should be consulted when reading the follow-
ing text.
A. PRELIMINARY MEASURES
The purpose of all preliminary measures is two-fold.
First, they save time in case of crisis and second, they
help to reduce or eliminate some foreseeable impacts of arises
on the decision-making process.




. Self -Evaluation and Education of the Leader cr
Manager
Successful leadership depends on an ability to apply
skills acquired through experience, study and obser-
vation. One of these skills is that of guiding the
efforts of others in the right direction without a
strict use of the authority, prestige and power
associated with a given position. [Ref . k6, p. ^37]
This excellent summary of leadership qualities
should encourage the leader or manager to improve his own
skills continuously, because he will need them desperately
in crises. In addition, he needs
the skill to put that extra fire into an organization
- that plus which enables it to win when the chips are
down, which causes it to get through a crisis, which
enables it to do more than anyone anticipated it could
do. [Ref. 3, P- 1133
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Crises can be anticipated by imagination, and solu-
tions can be developed during normal times. This mental ex-
ercise or "individual war gaming" should be done frequently.
It will not only help to reduce the surprise effect and to
save time in acute crises, but it will improve normal manage-
ment too. Management by exception or by objectives should allow
the time necessary to anticipate possible future developments.
2 . Screening of the Staff Members
It is important to know:
- The psychologically balanced and physically resis-
tant people who probably will not have surprising
reactions during crises. The physical condition
is important because crisis management means rest-
less activities over hours or even days. Break-
downs, with their inherent problem of changing
behavioral patterns, are dangerous. Experiments
done by Levin suggest that individuals who have
gone through mild environmental stresses luring
their development, are more resistant to stress
than those who were well protected, [cited in Ref
31, P- 378]
- The mentally flexible people who show leader-
ship qualities and have the ability to see prob-
lems in their general context. These staff mem-
bers, called "generalists , " are candidates to
head task forces or be members of a "nucleus."

- The egoistic power stragglers that are not goal oriented
but self oriented only. They should be eliminated
from crisis management and put in positions where
they don't hamper the decision-making process.
- The people who have a positive critical view. They
should be put into a place where they can play a
devil's advocate role. On the other hand, staff
members who are chronic fault finders, waste time
and energy, and should therefore be eliminated from
participation in crisis management.
- The people who are trusted and checked tc handle
classified information and material.
3 . Improving Staff -Line Relationship
L. Allen mentions the following general, mutual
complaints
:
- Staff tends to assume line authority
- Staff does not give sound advice
- Staff steals credit (for successful programs)
- Staff fails to see the whole picture
- Line does not make proper use of staff
- Line resists new ideas
- Line does not give staff enough authority
[Ref. 1, pp. 380-381]
These complaints show potential mistrust, hence, con-
flict which can have negative effects, especially in crises,
when feelings are no longer repressed.
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Increased interaction and managerial emphasis on
improved technology transfer between line and staff should
help to create better mutual understanding.
4. Establishment of a Basic Crisis Organization Tr.ar:
An important general rule to observe is that of main-
taining the existing group structure as much as possible,
even if tasks change.
The basic crisis organization chart has tc ce adapted
to the prevailing situation in the event of a crisis, cut car-
at least be applied "as is" at the beginning. Figure 9 shews
a possible crisis-organization chart, cased on the ilea of
a parallel decision making, as described on pages iZ-o7 •
Some explanations:
The task force "normal operations" has tc manage the
still on-going normal operations, whereas the other task
forces and the "external aid team" concentrate on crisis
management. The task of the "external aid team" is tc lock
for help from the environment, especially governmental agencies,
affiliated organizations or even competitors and tc make
proposals for the help's integration. The "information and
communication center" gathers all information and spreads it.
It seeks to close information loopholes by active reconnaissance
and to establish needed communications in accordance with the
chief of staff. In addition, it filters the information.
The chief of public relations should be directly


























Basic Crisis Organization Char":
The chart may serve to start crisis decision
making rapidly but should then be adapted to
the prevailing situation.
subordination




do his job in strict accordance with the prevailing policy.
Everybody in the organization must know that only the PR
department is authorized to give information to the outside.
The idea of the "pool of specialists" is described
on page 60
.
5 . War Gaming
To be more accurate, "crisis management games" in-
volving staff and line people should be carried out period-
ically. Such games help individuals to think about different
possibilities of crises and give them hints on how to handle
them. They serve also to test people and the crisis organization.
As a result, much uncertainty is eliminated in the
case of an actual crises. In addition, weak points in the
on-going activities might come up and can be eliminated
following this training.
It is important that crisis management games last
long enough and are sufficiently difficult sc that the psycho-
logically unbalanced or physically weak pecple can be noticed.
B. PROCEDURE IN AN ON-GOING CRISIS
1 . Coping with the Psychological Disequilibrium
The leader or manager must have three possible
spots of disequilibrium in mind
- himself
- his staff
- people in the crisis center
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It is dangerous to act before the leader or manager
and his staff have regained an equilibrium which allows
sound decision making.
The personality of the leader or manager is a crucial
point here. If he looks confident and "cool," this attitude
will soon influence his staff. In order to calm down people
in the crisis part, accurate and quick information and
goal-oriented action, either by the leader/manager himself
or a competent deputy, is absolutely necessary. This cannot
be stressed enough.
2 . Gathering of Facts and Immediate Countermeasure
s
After gathering the most important facts and making
a very rough structuring of the upcoming problems, a first,
time-related discrimination must be made. 3cme problems might
obviously need immediate action without previous, detailed
analysis. Hence, the prevailing situation should be screened
for such necessities and those actions should be taken with
high priority.
3- Relating the Crisis to the Whole
Because crisis situations tend to dominate manager's
minds, it is important to estimate roughly and rapidly what
percentage of the leader's or manager's scope of responsibility
is affected by crisis. In the military, this percentage may
be expressed in organizational units such as companies or
battalions, or in the amount of firepower, strong points,
ships, aircraft s, or other equipment affected. In business
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it is interesting to know what percentages of sales volume,
production, labor, raw materials, buildings, equipment and
other assets are affected by crisis. Establishing this re-
lationship can help to avoid over-emphasizing the crisis and
neglecting the more important remainder.
Estimating this percentage should in no way delay
the decision-making process. If a rough estimate (for ex-
ample it is 10, 25, 50%) cannot be made within minutes, as
may be the case in an A-plant accident, it has to be handled
as a normal lack-of-information problem by the information
and communication center. The leader or manager should in
this case immediately go to step ^.
k. Looking For Reasons
The leader or manager should make an early determina-
tion as to which elements of the external or internal environ-
ment, or which factors in his own organisation, caused the
crisis. Hence, when proceeding to step 5 (problem structuring),
both causes and effects of crises should be kept in mind.
Depending on the situation, it might be worthwhile to assign
to a special task force the problem of determining how to
diminish or eliminate the causes.
5 • Structuring the Problems
The leader/manager alone, or together with key staff
members, must list all the problems. Then the problems should
be structured as described on pages 57-60 and Appendix I.
With the resulting ranking order, the priorities are set.
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6. Adaption of the Basic Crisis Organization
When the problems are structured, the existing basic
crisis organization (as determined in the crisis organization
chart) must be adapted to the actual situation.
7
.
Assignment of Problems to the Task Force s
If the parallel decision-making procedure was chosen,
the problems must be assigned to different task forces. The
task forces should know very precisely their objectives
and the amount of authority each was delegated, especially
what decisions they are not allowed to make without consensus
of the superior. Then they work according to the normal
decision-making procedures as described in IV. A on pages V7-51
8. Establishing a Time Budget
Calculating back from the latest time when measures
must be implemented before they become obsolete, the follow-
ing latest acceptable times for each of the problems must
be estimated by the coordination team:
- start of implementation in the crisis center
- time when involved people in the crisis center
must know about the decisions made by the crisis
command or management
- time when the staff must have finished documents
(orders, directives) and other measures in order
to transmit them to the recipients
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- time when the leader/manager must have made
the decisions
The resulting timetable is a crucial instrument of
control for the chief of staff, the coordination team and
also partially for the leader or manager.
If estimates are difficult to make, it might be use-
ful if the task forces make them.
9 . Coordination and Control
Independently of the decision-making procedure,
sequential or parallel, chosen, coordination of the work ~c
be done on the several problems and strict enforcement of
compliance with the time budget, now become crucial. If a
chief of staff or a special coordination team exists, the
leader or manager is free to either visit the :erter of
crisis or concentrate checking on the most important problems
The coordination must make sure that zhe crisis
affected subordinates are not given too many separate orders
and directives for each problem, but instead one well-
coordinated and integrated set.
10 . Implementation
As described earlier on page 79 , the leader or
manager must pay special attention to the psychological




Crisis management is neither an art nor pure technique,
but it requires higher skills than normal management in two
aspects. First, the psychological impacts of a crisis
require a "better understanding of human needs and behavior.
Second, much more flexibility and intelligence is necessary
to handle the managerial tools such as: problem analysis,
development and evaluation of alternative solutions, setting
priorities, making choices under conditions of high un-
certainty, adapting organizational structures, gathering and
evaluating information and handling communications. While
personality plays a crucial role in the first aspect, train-
ing can help to improve the ability to master the managerial
tools
.
Time and money spent in effective preliminary measures
will not only pay off greatly in crises, but may also improve
normal management. Nevertheless, crises need strong person-















































































































































































































































(Continued on page 93)
Appendix II
INTEGRATIVE CRISIS DECISION MAKING MODEL
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